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Comment

Resolving the MDP Issue: Deciding If the
Status Quo Is What's Best for the Client

I.

INTRODUCTION

On the forefront of the current debate surrounding legal ethics is the

heated question of whether the legal profession should permit its
members to participate in multidisciplinary practices or partnerships
("MDPs") and thereby share fees with nonlawyers. Currently, this
conduct is prohibited by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.' This

1. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1998). Model Rule 5.4
provides the following:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the
lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared
lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other
representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in compensation or
retirement plans, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profitsharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities
of the partnership consists of the practice of law.
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issue clearly has global implications for various professions desiring to
partner with attorneys, and those persons with interest in this area have
followed the debate closely as viewpoints are researched and expressed

in support of one position over another. Nonetheless, the American Bar
Association ("ABA") has effectively closed the door on the question of
amending Model Rule 5.4 to allow MDPs.2 This leaves the matter
entirely in the hands of state bar associations and courts that establish
rules of professional conduct for their jurisdictions, thus meaning the
issue is not dead yet (to the dismay of MDP opponents). This Comment
addresses some of the underlying questions that all lawyers should ask
before hastily "rush[ing] to judgment"3 on the issue of whether their
state bar associations should relax the rules on the sharing of fees with
nonlawyers.4

(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or
association authorized to practice law for profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative
of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a
reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of
a lawyer.
Id.
2. See Robert R. Keatinge, Coloradoand Denver in the House: MDP Declared Heresy
by the ABA House of Delegates, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2000, at 48, 51. On July 11, 2000, the
ABA House of Delegates rejected by a 3-to-i margin the recommendation of the ABA
Commission studying Multidisciplinary Practice. See id. The 2000 Annual Meeting of the
ABA House of Delegates is discussed more fully herein. See infra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text.
3. This phrase is borrowed from the title of an article on MDPs and the debate
surrounding them. See George S. Swan, The American BarAssociation:Rush to Judgment,
4 NLA REV. 10 (2000).
4. In light of the ABA's rejection of the proposal to study further or adopt a favorable
rule on MDPs, one commentator has urged states facing the issue (and thus, the lawyers
and judges who will vote within state bar associations and courts) to begin the "analysis
with a clean slate, as though our new world were a foreign country, newly liberated from
an outworn despotism, and we seek to design a legal system consistent with a free society
in a free world." George W. Overton, MDP: Will It Rise From the Dead?, CBA RECORD,
Sept. 2000, at 62. In Overton's opinion the historic view disfavoring MDPs should not be
"given any presumptive priority" as states address the issue now; rather, the analysis
should begin anew. Id.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Important Definitions

By its most basic definition, an MDP is "a partnership owned by
lawyers and professionals from other disciplines who work together to
solve client problems."5 According to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice ("Commission"), a unit of the ABA organized to study the
issue of fee sharing with nonlawyers, the term "multidisciplinary
practice" refers to
a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity
that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its
purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the
MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal,
as well as legal, services[.] It includes an arrangement by which a law
firm joins with one or more professional firms to provide services, and
there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.6
Of course, as each state individually wrestles with the notion of
whether to allow lawyers to participate in MDPs, it will shape its own
definition of what constitutes an MDP. Furthermore, the totality of the
relevant facts and circumstances will always dictate whether the
relationship between a lawyer and nonlawyer in delivering legal and
nonlegal services to a client amounts to an MDP under the definition.7
This should be consistent regardless of the definition chosen. However,
for the purposes of this article, the Commission's definition will be the
working definition used.
In its work on behalf of the ABA, the Commission further defined
"legal services" as "services, which if provided by a lawyer engaged in
the practice of law, would be regarded as part of such practice of law for
purposes of the application of the rules of professional conduct."'

5. Dianne Molvig, MultidisciplinaryPractices: Service Package of the Future?, Wis.
LAW., April 1999, at 10, 11 (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.wisbar.org/wislawmag/
archive/april99/mdp.html>.
6. ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Appendix A [hereinafter Commission
Appendix A] (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/CPR/mdpappendixa.html>.
This definition was offered as an illustrative amendment to the Terminology section of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but it was not part of the Recommendation upon
which the ABA House of Delegates would vote. See id.
7. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Report (visited March 3, 2001)
<httpJ/www.abanet.org/CPR/mdpreport.html>.
8. Commission Appendix A, supra note 6.
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Building on that language, the term "practice of law" was explained to
denote
the provision of professional legal advice or services where there is a
client relationship of trust or reliance. One is presumed to be
practicing law when engaging in any of the following conduct on behalf
of another:
(a) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages,
assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other
instruments intended to affect interests in real or personal property,
wills, codicils, instruments intended to affect the disposition of property
of decedents' estates, documents relating to business and corporate
transactions, other instruments intended to affect or secure legal
rights, and contracts except routine agreements incidental to a regular
course of business;
(b) Preparing or expressing legal opinions;
(c) Appearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal;
(d) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or any
written documents containing legal argument or interpretation of law,
for filing in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal;
(e) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of these activities
described in subparagraph (a) through (d) might be done, or whether
they were done, in accordance with applicable law;
(f) Furnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons, to render
the services described in subparagraphs (a) through (e) above.9
B. PriorEfforts to IncorporateNonlawyer Partnershipsand Fee
Sharing into the Ethical Guidelines for Lawyers
In its current version, Model Rule 5.4 effectively prohibits MDPs by its
provisions, which are designed to preclude or minimize the influence of
nonlawyer third parties.' ° When the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1983,
the sharing of fees with nonlawyers was also a controversial topic,
although the debate did not change the ABA's formal position on that

9. Id. The Commission's definition for the term "practice of law" is based largely on
a similar definition used in District of Columbia Rule 49. See id. The existing Model Rules
of Professional Conduct do not have a provision defining what constitutes the practice of
law, but instead leave that to individual states to decide either by rule or case law. See
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Appendix C: Reporter's Notes for the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/

CPRlmdpappendixc.html>. The definition announced by the Commission is merely given
as a model provision, and the Commission acknowledged that each state may desire for its
highest court to continue to determine the scope of the definition of the practice of law. See
id.
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1998).
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subject, which is now codified in Rule 5.4." This debate surrounding
nonlawyer participation in the law was centered squarely in the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, which became
known informally as the "Kutak Commission."' 2
Almost twenty-five years before the current showdown over MDPs, the
Kutak Commission proposed an amended version of Rule 5.4 under
which earlier versions of MDPs could be formed as long as lawyers could
meet their professional responsibilities under the ethics rules.'"
Recognizing that "safeguards" were needed to ensure ethical compliance,
the Kutak Commission proposed Rules 5.3 and 5.5(b) as well as a
provision that would have required written assurance that a lawyer's
provides
independence of judgment would be secured when that lawyer
14
legal services in an organization managed by nonlawyers.
However, opponents challenged the proposed version due to both
general and specific concerns. First, these critics feared that the rule
would allow accounting firms and other service providers to open law

11. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who
Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 584 (1989). Canons under the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics had earlier prohibited both lawyer-nonlawyer
partnerships and fee-splitting between lawyers and nonlawyers, and these provisions were
modified to become disciplinary rules under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
See id. at 588.
12. See id. at 593-96. The Kutak Commission, named for Chairman Robert Kutak, was
formed to evaluate and revise the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and its
proposals were largely adopted and renamed the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
1983. See Utah State Bar Multidisciplinary Task Force Report [hereinafter Utah Report]
(visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.utahbar.org/sites/mdp/html/mdp-task-force-report.
html> (providing a history of the prohibitions on MDPs within legal ethics); see also
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 61 & n.72 (Prac. ed. 1986).
13. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 593-94. In 1976 the Kutak Commission proposed
the following text for Rule 5.4:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial interest is held
or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or by a lawyer acting in a
capacity other than that of representing clients, such as a business corporation,
insurance company, legal services organization or government agency, but only if:
(a) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) Information relating to representation of the client is protected as required
by Rule 1.6;
(c) The organization does not engage in advertising or personal contact with
prospective clients if a lawyer employed by the organization would be prohibited
from doing so by Rule 7.2 or Rule 7.3; and
(d) The arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates Rule 1.5.
Id.
14. See Utah Report, supra note 12.
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firms and compete with traditional firms.'" Second, they were afraid
that the independent judgment of lawyers would be threatened by
nonlawyer ownership of firms."6 Finally, opponents voiced a general,
overarching fear that such fee sharing would have a "fundamental but
unknown effect on the legal profession."' 7 After weighing these
objections, the ABA House of Delegates rejected the Kutak Commission's
proposed Rule 5.4 and instead substituted the current Rule 5.4, which
includes an absolute ban on fee sharing.'"
Scholars and practitioners alike have criticized the decision to reject
the rule proposed by the Kutak Commission, especially in light of the
degree to which it worked to ensure that valuable ethical precepts were
guarded and preserved. 9 Many believe that what ultimately buried
any chance of passing a provision for fee sharing at the 1983 meeting
was the "fear of Sears," a phrase that arose during floor debate.2"
According to one recollection, when Professor Geoffrey Hazard was asked
if Sears, Roebuck would be able to open a law office under the proposed
rule, he answered "yes," at which point the debate quickly ended, leading
to the rejection of the Kutak Commission's proposal. 2 '

15. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 595-96. See infra text accompanying notes 20-21.
16. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 595-96.
17. Id. It is interesting that in the last twenty-five years the criticism of and grounds
for opposition to MDPs have remained substantially unchanged.
18. See id. at 596. Of all the rules proposed by the Kutak Commission, this rule was
the only one completely rejected by the ABA House of Delegates. See Utah Report, supra
note 12.
19. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES, 2 THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 5.4:101, at 796 (Supp.
1991). While addressing the rejection of the Kutak Commission's proposal, the criticism
elicited from these two noted commentators also might ring true for the more recent
rejection of an amendment allowing MDPs:
The Kutak Commission's carefully layered safeguards were disregarded, and in
their place was put a flat prohibition on sharing fees or organizational authority
with non-lawyers regardless of whether any specific harms occur or are even
threatened. This substitution of a broad prophylactic rule where a narrow one
would have sufficed suggests that ... [an] illegitimate rationale was actually
decisive, namely economic protectionism.
Id.
20. See Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New
Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 876-77 (1999).
21. See Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: ModerateProposals
Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 392 (1988). However, this ground for
disposing of the proposed rule cannot be found anywhere in the relevant legislative history.
See id. at 384-92; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 160 (1987).
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In the interim between passing Rule 5.4 of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1976 and today's debate over amending or
deleting that rule to allow MDPs, one jurisdiction has partially
abandoned the ABA's formal position. Washington, D.C. modified its
version of Rule 5.4 to allow lawyers and nonlawyers to form partnerships
and share fees. 22 As bold as this step was, the D.C. rule itself is not as
revolutionary as some recent proposals. First, the D.C. rule limits
partnership agreements and fee sharing to entities that are structured
as law firms, and these law firms must only provide legal services to
clients. 23 Thus, the nonlawyers must provide services that are related
to the legal services in more than a tangential way to satisfy the D.C.

22. See WASHINGTON, D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1999). That
rule provides the following:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the
lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total
compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased
lawyer;
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation
or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profitsharing arrangement; and
(4) Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other form of organization
which meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the
organization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal
services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest
undertake to abide by these rules of professional conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer
participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under
Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
Id.

23. Id.; see also COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE TO THE ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, BACKGROUND PAPER ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE: ISSUES AND
DEVELOPMENTS, Jan. 1999, at 17 n.5 [hereinafter COMMISSION BACKGROUND PAPER] (visited
March 3, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreportO199.html>.
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rule. Clearly, this rule does not contemplate the "one-stop shopping"
model that epitomizes the current support for MDPs today.24 Second,
a formal ethics opinion has further narrowed the scope of the D.C. rule
by deciding that a multijurisdictional law firm with a D.C. office may not
have a nonlawyer practice in the D.C. office.25 In light of these
restrictions, the D.C. rule cannot provide much direction in the debate
over MDPs today, but instead may be viewed more appropriately as a
small impetus for the movement to change Model Rule 5.4. Those who
seek a compromise might point to it as a middle ground that allows
MDPs without compromising the core values of the profession. Even
still, there are those hard-line advocates of the current Model Rule 5.4
that would look upon the D.C. rule as sacrificing the ideals of the
profession.
C. The True Impetus: The Emergence of MDPs Internationallyand
the Call for Them in the United States
While the D.C. rule did its part for injecting the term "MDP" into the
legal vernacular, this result was due in larger part to the explosion of
accounting and consulting services into what has historically been
regarded as the practice of law. Beginning in the early 1990s, accounting firms such as the "Big 5"6 began acquiring law firms in Europe;
mergers and acquisitions also occurred in Canada and Australia. The
effect of these arrangements is that accounting firms now provide legal
services practically worldwide. Germany, Canada, France, Switzerland,
and Australia all allow MDPs to some degree, and other countries are
considering the measure as well.2 7
In Germany, nonlawyer members of MDPs are subject to the country's
professional rules of conduct for lawyers. German MDPs are typically
smaller and thus do not face as many problems with conflicts of interest

24. See infra notes 61, 64-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "one-stop
shopping" rationale for allowing MDPs.

25. See Terry, supra note 20, at 875 (citing Testimony of Susan Gilbert (D.C. Bar) (Nov.
12, 1998)).
26. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P., KPMG Peat Marwick
L.L.P., Ernst & Young L.L.P., and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu L.L.P. are considered the "Big
5" accounting firms. Each has multinational offices around the world, and those offices
outside the United States already provide legal services, including litigation. See Commission on Multidisciplinary

Practice and Related Trends Affecting the Profession,

Pennsylvania Bar Association, Preliminary Report to 1999 Mid-Year Meeting of PBA House
of Delegates, Sept. 15, 1999 [hereinafter Pennsylvania Preliminary Report] (visited March
3, 2001) <http://www.pa-bar.org/mdp9l5rp.shtml>.
27. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 20, at 883-890 (describing the "[g]lobal [r]esponses to
MDPs").
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and confidentiality. However, the German bar remains interested in the
effects of MDPs on competition and client choice for legal services.2"
Canada likewise allows MDPs, but nonlawyers participating in MDPs
are limited to providing legal services only.29 Again, confidentiality,
loyalty, and independence of judgment are the overriding concerns in
Canada as they are in the United States.3"
France has allowed accounting firms to affiliate with law firms, and
this has led to a "captive" law firm arrangement whereby the two
professions remain separate but share the same client base."' Switzerland permits single-entity MDPs, and this arrangement is facilitated by
the domination of the Swiss economy by the banking industry, which
values the use of various professionals to make an informed decision.32
By deregulating its legal profession in the last twenty years, the United
Kingdom has moved toward the creation of "legal practice plus" and
"linked partnerships" for alliances between solicitors and nonlawyers,
although the current rules still do not allow partnering or sharing of fees
between lawyers and nonlawyers there.33 Portugal and Denmark do
not allow the formation of MDPs. 4 Spain has not taken a clear stand,
although it has "energetically denounce[d]" the establishment of MDPs

28. See Scott A. Jensen, Ethical Underpinnings for Multidisciplinary Practice
Regulations in the United States and Abroad: Are Accounting Firmsand Law FirmsReally
Different? (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.stthom.edu/cbes/ethunder.html>.
29. See id. This arrangement is similar to Rule 5.4 of the District of Columbia Rules
of Professional Conduct. See supra note 22.
30. See id.
31. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON THE LAW
GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, REPORT: PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION-THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 195-200 (2000); see also COMMISSION BACKGROUND PAPER, supra
note 23, at pt. I; MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE TASK FORCE, THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER
CANADA, The Affiliated or "Captive" Law Firm, Sept. 1999 (visited March 3, 2001)
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/mdpbkgrdpapercaptive-en.shtml>.
32. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPractice and the
American Legal Profession:A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services
in the Twenty.First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 115 (2000) (citing Interview by John
S. Dzienkowski and Robert J. Peroni with Carl Baudenbacher, Professor of Law, St. Gallen,
Switzerland, Judge, EFTA Court of the European Union (July 1999)).

33. See Alison Crawley, The Law Society of England and Wales, Written Remarks to
the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (1999) (visited March 3, 2001)
<http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/crawley.html>; Lucy Hickman, LawSoc Votes for MDPs After
1O-Year Wait, THE LAWYER, Oct. 18, 1999, at 2.

34. See Jensen, supra note 28. On an interesting note, Denmark does not prohibit law
firms from adopting the name of an accounting firm. See id. This would apparently serve
the efficiency and name-brand purpose or argument supporting MDPs even though MDPs
themselves are not allowed. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71 (discussing "namebrand" recognition).
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with lawyers and auditors as partners. 5 However, the debate continues in the United States.
Within the last ten years, accounting firms have aggressively begun
offering more taxation services to their clients, beginning with providing
advice that required some application and interpretation of federal law
on taxation. 6 However, this meek beginning ballooned into what some
lawyers and bar associations have characterized as the unauthorized
practice of law ("UPL") in violation of Model Rule 5.5.37 Tax advice
morphed into a consulting arm of the accounting firms, and now the "Big
5" offer advice on litigation support, ERISA, and regulatory compliance,
as well as other matters.3" These same accounting firms have begun
offering their clients representation on tax matters in court.3" Congress
recently extended the attorney-client privilege to include taxpayer and
tax practitioner in some circumstances.4" The accounting firms lobbied
heavily for this provision.4 1
Perhaps the most clear-cut example of the accounting profession's
action in moving into legal practice is its calculated effort to recruit
lawyers from law schools and traditional law firms to serve either in
their MDPs outside the United States or in their consulting firms in the
United States. 42 These same accounting firms have formed "strategic
alliances" with large law firms to provide services contemplated by
MDPs. For instance, the Atlanta office of King & Spalding recently lost
several lawyers who left to begin a new firm called McKee Nelson Ernst
& Young, which is affiliated with the accounting and consulting firm of
Ernst & Young.43 These "alliances" or "ventures" manage to avoid

35. Jensen, supra note 28.
36. See COMMISSION BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 23, at pt. II.
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1998).
See also
COMMISSION BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 23, at pt. II. While one might expect the
number of UPL investigations to be significant given the debate over the entry of
accounting firms into the practice of law, there are only two records of such enforcement
actions. See id.; see also Elizabeth McDonald, Legal Beat: Texas ProbesAndersen, Deloitte
on Chargesof PracticingLaw, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1998, at B15.
38. See COMMISSION BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 23, at pt. II.
39. See id.
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 7525 (Supp. IV 1998). Section 7525 was enacted as part of the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,

§ 3411(a), 112 Stat. 685, 750 (July 23, 1998). The Act extends the attorney-client privilege
to communication between a taxpayer and a federally authorized tax practitioner. Id.
41. See COMMISSION BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 23, at pt. II.
42. See id.
43. See Ernst & Young Launches First Domestic Law Firm, TAX NOTES, Nov. 8, 1999,
at 719; Jonathan Groner & Siobhan Roth, Envisioning a Big 5 Law Firm, LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1999, at 1; Tom Herman, Ernst & Young Will Finance Launch of Law Firm in

20011

RESOLVING THE MDP ISSUE

1201

restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law and sharing of fees
under a state's rules of professional conduct."' In fact, attempts to
investigate individuals or groups for the unauthorized practice of law
have been largely unsuccessful.4 5 For this reason, MDP advocates point
to this as evidence of de facto MDPs abounding.
D.

The ABA Commission on MultidisciplinaryPractice

In August 1998, ABA President Philip Anderson appointed the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to reconsider the issue of
lawyer-nonlawyer partnerships in light of the most recent developments
in the practice of law; the Commission was charged to "'study and report
on the extent to which and the manner in which professional service
firms operated by accountants and others who are not lawyers are
seeking to provide legal services to the public."' 48 The Commission held
hearings in November 1998 and issued a report that examined the
movement toward MDPs, the success and failures that various disciplines had experienced in the MDP setting, and the current ethical
framework banning MDPs.47 Early the next year, the Commission
limited the scope of its inquiry to four issues:
(1) the benefit and harm of allowing lawyers to partner and share fees
with non-lawyers; (2) the effect of such partnering or fee-sharing on
professional independence; (3) the difference between the professional
rules governing lawyers and accountants; and (4) if lawyers were
permitted to deliver legal services as employees or partners of non-law
firms, what changes should be made to (i) the confidentiality rules, (ii)
the conflicts-of-interest principle of imputed disqualification, (iii) the
ethics rules imposing responsibility upon partners or supervisory
lawyers, (iv) the ethics rules on unauthorized practice, (v) the ethics
rules on advertising, (vi) the extent of disciplinary reach48 of the state
bars upon such non-law firms, and (vii) any other areas.
The Commission held two more meetings in February and March of
1999, and members continued to receive commentary and correspondence

Special Arrangement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at B10. The arrangement called for the
new firm to be the debtor and neighbor of Ernst & Young, who would finance the new firm
although the two divisions would not share legal fees or profits. See Terry, supra note 20,
at 879-80.
44. See Pennsylvania Preliminary Report, supra note 26.
45. See Terry, supra note 20, at 882. See supra note 37.
46. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 127 (quoting American Bar Association,
News Release, ABA PresidentPhilip S. Anderson Appoints Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice(Aug. 4, 1998)).
47. See id. at 129-30.
48. See id. at 130 (citations omitted).
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on the issue of MDPs.49 This gleaning of information resulted in the
publication of the Commission's Final Report, which was issued on June
8, 1999, for consideration at the ABA House of Delegates' August 1999
meeting.50 The Commission offered a broad recommendation that the
Model Rules not limit lawyers in the vehicles in which they provide legal
services to clients, going as far as to say that even nonlawyer-controlled
MDPs should be allowed as long as the core values of the legal
profession remain unthreatened through the use of safeguards.5 1
Lively debate ensued between opponents of the Commission's proposal
and those who supported the progressive views.52 This led the Commission to move to defer the issue until further study could be conducted,
and the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution that no amendments permitting MDPs should be passed for the Model Rules "unless
and until additional study demonstrates that such changes will further
the public interest without sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession's tradition of loyalty to clients."53
The Commission worked tirelessly to receive additional feedback on
the issue of legal services through MDPs, traveling around the United
States to hear different viewpoints and to defend its position in the Final
Report.54 The Commission issued its ultimate recommendations to the
ABA House of Delegates in March 2000 for consideration at the July
2000 meeting in New York. 5 The ABA House of Delegates rejected the
measure by a 3-to-1 margin and replaced it with a counterproposal
reaffirming the legal profession's commitment to its core values and the
incompatibility of MDPs with those core values.5" The Colorado Bar
offered a compromise proposal that would defer the vote and refer the
57
The
matter for further study; however, this was similarly rejected.

49.
50.
51.
52.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

at 130-31.
at 132.
132-33.
135-45.

53.

ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, UPDATED BACKGROUND AND

INFORMATIONAL REPORT AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS (visited March 3,2001) <http://www
.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html>.
54. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 146.
55. See id. at 146-47. For a thorough examination of the draft of the March 2000
recommendation of the Commission, see Terry, supra note 20.
56. See Recommendation 1OF, Presented to the ABA House of Delegates (July 2000)
(visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecoml0F.html>. This measure
was sponsored by the state bar associations of Florida, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and New
York, and the bar associations of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and Erie County, Pennsylvania.
See id.
57. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 148. For the colorful perspective of
a Colorado delegate who supported the Commission's proposal and has since refused to
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ABA House of Delegates thanked the Commission for its efforts and
announced there would be no further study on the matter.5"
III.

DISCUSSION

Because the ABA House of Delegates ceased all study of MDPs, this
task has been left to the individual states if there is to be any revolution
in Rule 5.4 at all. 9 The Commission's report to the ABA House of
Delegates has provided a useful starting point or foundation for state bar
associations, which must weigh the arguments discussed below to resolve
the issue of MDPs.6 °
A.

The Debate Surrounding MDPs

Ironically, both proponents and opponents of MDPs assert that they
hold the client's interests as the foremost consideration in the discourse
surrounding this issue, but each side differs in its interpretation of what
is best for the client. Proponents offer efficient, "one-stop shopping" for
the client61 while opponents urge that the client is best served by
confidentiality, loyalty, independence of judgment, and competence as
they are now understood under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 2 One commentator has appropriately summed up the debate
through tried and true clichds, beginning first with the opponents' view,
"[i]f it ain't broke, don't fix it," as contrasted to the ideas espoused by the
proponents, "those who say that 'the train has left the station,' so the
time to regulate MDPs is now or never. "63

hide his bitterness at its defeat, see Keatinge, supra note 2, at 48.
58. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 148.
59. One pair of commentators has suggested that with this vote of rejection, "the ABA
has abdicated its role of leadership on the ethical issues relating to MDPs and effectively
'voted itself into irrelevance.'" See id. at 149 (quoting Sheryl Stratton & Lee A. Sheppard,
American Bar Association Says No to MultidisciplinaryPractice, 88 TAX NOTES 311, 311
(2000)). In fact, the two authors have gone as far as to suggest that the ABA, through its
failure to act, has "implicitly sanctioned civil disobedience" by those service firms that
desire to work in a multidisciplinary fashion. Id.
60. This Comment is limited in its scope to providing only a cursory review of the
debate surrounding MDPs to acquaint the general practitioner with the subject. The
Commission's website includes reports, letters, transcripts of hearings and debates, and
other materials. As such, that website is a valuable resource for studying the issue further.
See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/multicom.html>.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 64-79.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 80-109.
63. See Terry, supra note 20, at 948 n.357, n.358.
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1. Support for MDPs. Chief among the justification supporting
MDPs in the United States is the belief that clients want "one-stop
shopping" for professional services.64 In a day and age when consumers
flock to malls and giant grocery stores that offer everything from eggs
to oil changes, one might not be surprised to hear that the average
consumer would seek the same efficiency in receiving professional
services.6"
The rationale commonly presented is that MDPs will expand the range
of legal services available to the public and simultaneously make those
services more affordable. The economist would refer to this phenomenon
as "economies of scale," which quite simply means that as an entity
grows in size, it saves money and resources and thus is able to pass
along savings to its constituents, be they customers or clients." This
"one-stop shopping" model also proposes to give clients more comprehensive solutions to their problems by having the MDP present a myriad of
services related to those the lawyer would provide the client. For
instance, a client involved as a plaintiff in a personal injury matter
might have the attorney in the MDP represent him during the litigation,
the accountant offer tax advice on structuring the settlement, and the
investor manage the settlement award to provide the client with
liquidity and a return on the settlement. Without leaving the four walls
of the MDP, the client would have all of these services at his fingertips,
and the services presumably would be less expensive for the client
because the professionals would be sharing some fixed costs and
overhead. The number of other examples in which this arrangement
would be beneficial are too numerous to list in full.67

64.

See generally COMMISSION

ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE,

AMERICAN BAR

ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES [hereinafter ABA Final Report] (visited
on March 3, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html>.
65. However "efficient" this seems though, one opponent of MDPs and "one-stop
shopping" has likened it to a "nightmare," predicting "a world where lawyers answered to

non-lawyers, where professionalism had given way to the bottom line, where pro bono
services and client loyalty were disbanded, and where law had become a product sold by
multinational accounting firms and corporations." Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32,
at 135 (describing speech by Lawrence Fox to the ABA House of Delegates); see also George
S. Swan, The PoliticalEconomy of InterprofessionalImperialism: The Bar and Multidisciplinary Practice, 1999-2001, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 151, 189 (2000) (recounting how Fox
"forecast lawyers ... attempting to unionize" after five years under MDPs).
66. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 120-22.
67. See Caryn Langbaum, Will Attorneys Vote Themselves Out of the Competition?, RES
GESTAE, Oct. 2000, at 12, 15. Some of those potential partnerships are included herein
simply as an example of the possibilities: "Family lawyers and social workers; environmen-

tal lawyers and geologists; business or estate planning lawyers and accountants or
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Opponents, on the other hand, point out that lawyers are already
making use of other disciplines within their representation of clients;
these specialists simply are not sharing office space."8 Personal injury
and worker's compensation lawyers and doctors work hand in hand to
help clients, as do experts on any number of other endeavors. The only
difference is that the nonlawyers do not share in the legal fees received,
thus explaining why opponents of MDPs view these partnerships as
simply an opportunity for nonlawyers to "stick their hands in the cookie
jar."
As things stand today, the legal profession allows advertising of
attorneys' services to the public as long as the objective and means of the
advertising meet particular regulations, which each state selects through
its bar associations.6 9 To the unsophisticated (and to some degree, even
the sophisticated) consumer of legal services, the prospect of having to
seek out an attorney from the marketplace can be quite confusing and
alarming given that word-of-mouth referrals are still a predominant
method of "advertising" even in the twenty-first century. MDPs, on the
other hand, offer the consumer and potential client a certain type of
name-brand recognition that attaches to the other professionals that
would be associated within the MDP.7
This is most evident in the example of the "Big 5" accounting firms,
which cohesively serve as one of the main forces behind relaxing the
current rule against sharing fees with nonlawyers. For instance,
someone may not know the name of a tax attorney in his locale (or even
a firm offering those services, for that matter); however, the name
Arthur Andersen or PriceWaterhouseCoopers is strongly associated with
consulting and accounting services, including providing taxation advice,
which is arguably a legal matter.7
To the MDP advocates, the
partnering of lawyers with other professionals in a mixed setting will
only benefit the client by guiding the client to all of the services in a
more efficient manner in the short run and then solving a larger
percentage of the client's problems over the long run.

financial consultants; antitrust lawyers and economists; medical malpractice litigators and
medical illustrators; technology lawyers and information technology consultants or systems
analysts; intellectual property lawyers and engineers; health care lawyers and doctors."

Id.
68. See COMMISSION BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 23, at 12.
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 (1998).
70. See supra note 34 (discussing Denmark's approach to MDPs and name-brand
recognition).

71. See Molvig, supra note 5, at 11. In fact, one observer has commented that "more
tax law [is] practiced in accounting firms than in all the U.S. law firms, and that's been the
case for 20 years." Id.
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MDP supporters also point to nonlawyers' efficiency in management
techniques and their ability to infuse capital into the firm for further
expansion and training.7 2 Also, an MDP may have an easier time at
borrowing money at a lower interest rate in the debt market than a
traditional law firm, thus making the MDP appealing from another
financial aspect.73
In addition to saving time and money for the client, advocates for
MDPs point to substantive benefits to be gained from an interdisciplinary approach. The final decades of the twentieth century saw the
business world refocus its paradigms onto teamwork and bridge-building.
MDPs bring together teams of professionals with varying backgrounds
in different disciplines to serve clients. Government and corporations-viewed as de facto MDPs by some-have already experienced
proven success in this regard.74 As one commentator has suggested,
clients' "legal problems, once considered in a virtual legal vacuum, can
be approached multi-dimensionally, within a fuller context."" Another
has stated that lawyers "risk becoming a mere footnote in the twentyfirst century" if they fail to utilize interdisciplinary methods of solving
problems.7" Other professions view lawyers as lagging behind their
counterparts in the ever-changing global economy. Proponents of MDPs
suggest that lawyers "risk becoming dinosaurs" if they cannot find a way
to accept the new working paradigm for professionals, including
MDPs.77
Those who disagree with using MDPs as a vehicle for providing legal
services submit that "one-stop shopping" is just a euphemistic rationale
for offering business opportunities and profit centers to capitalists. 7
They also attempt to pierce the veil of this argument by suggesting that

72. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 125-26.
73. Id. at 126.
74. See Michael Gerrard, Statement of Position of MultidisciplinaryPractice,Executive
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 595 PLI/PAT 75, 80
(2000); see also Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 124-25 (describing how the IRS
employs economists and other professionals).
75. Langbaum, supra note 67, at 16.
76. Testimony of Steven A. Bennett (Banc One) (Nov. 13, 1998).
77. Id. The urgency of addressing the relationship of legal services and MDPs is
likewise characterized by proponents in other familiar phrases: "wake up and smell the
roses," Michael A. Landrum, Beyond ADR: The Opportunitiesfor Business Lawyers, BENCH
& B., Oct. 2000, at 45; and "the train has left the station and [is] headed down the track,"
Oral Testimony of Stefan Tucker (Chair, ABA Section of Taxation) (Feb. 4, 1999).
78. See Lawrence J. Fox, Dan's World: A Free EnterpriseDream;An Ethics Nightmare,
55 Bus. LAW. 1533, 1546 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Nightmare] (noting that "one-stop
shopping provid[es] ... convenience for the customer but, far more importantly, business
extensions for the entrepreneurs").
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transaction costs are not decreased as much with MDPs because
innovative technology-including e-mail, faxes, conference calls, and
teleconferencing-has the capacity to bring the lawyer to the forefront
of the competition.79
2. Criticism of MDPs. At the other end of the MDP continuum are
those opponents who believe that lawyer participation in MDPs will
forfeit the profession's "core values" and, in turn, sacrifice the client.8"
These core values include such familiar ethical precepts as confidentiality, loyalty to clients, and independent judgment of the lawyer.8 ' Each
of these concerns is addressed individually although they are heavily
intertwined in the debate over MDPs.
Clients anticipate being able to speak and write candidly with their
attorneys, and they expect those communications to be guarded as
confidential while used for their benefit as the attorney renders her
services. Moreover, the client does not expect these confidences to be
used to his detriment. This is consistent with Model Rule 1.6, which
generally prohibits attorneys from revealing their clients' confidential
communications unless authorized by law or necessary in the representation of that client.8 2 However, opponents of MDPs point to practical
problems of addressing how to maintain this confidential relationship in
the MDP when confidential information would be shared with nonlawyers on a regular basis. Opponents fear that the MDP's nonlawyers that
are not required to adhere to the rigors of state rules of professional
conduct are less8 3likely to cling to client confidentiality when the bottom
line is at stake.

Even when nonlawyers are not driven by the bottom line but instead
respond to duties within their own profession, client confidentially is
exposed to great risk, according to opponents of MDPs. The most
popular example of this is the juxtaposition of the professionals' duties
in the event the MDP undertakes an audit of the client: If the MDP

79. See William F. Harvey, MDP Versus the Legal Profession, RES GESTAE, Sept. 2000,
at 24, 30.

80. See Pennsylvania Preliminary Report, supra note 26; see also ABA Section of
Litigation Issues Forum, Multidisciplinary Practice Argument: Con [hereinafter Litigation

Con Argument] (visited March 3,2001) <http://www.abanet.org/litigation/issues/mdp/mdpcon.html>.
81. See Pennsylvania Preliminary Report, supra note 26; see also Litigation Con
Argument, supra note 80.
82. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998). This rule
anticipates lawyers' disclosing confidential information when it furthers the representation

and the client has not instructed the lawyer to refrain from doing so. See id. cmt. 7.
83. See Litigation Con Argument, supra note 80.
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were to perform the audit, it would have clear duties to disclose
particular information about past dealings that an attorney would be
required to keep confidential under the same circumstances.8 This
conflict certainly casts doubt on the ability of the MDP to ensure
confidentiality of the client's communications, and it is evident why this
concern is shared by many opponents across the country.85
Related to the idea of client confidentiality is the attorney-client
privilege. The necessary elements for the privilege are (1) a communication between attorney and client (2) in which the client seeks legal
advice or services.8 6 Underscoring this privilege is the lawyer's role as
a legal advisor.8 7 The attorney-client privilege would not arise when
a client seeks advice from a nonlawyer first because such a situation
lacks a necessary element: an attorney. Thus, a client who shares
information with a nonlawyer in the MDP context and believes that it
is privileged would not enjoy the attorney-client privilege for those
communications, even if the nonlawyer later communicated them to the
attorney and the attorney offered legal advice to the client.s In fact,
such communication may constitute a waiver of the attorney-client

84. See Langbaum, supra note 67, at 15 (noting that "the only irreconcilable difference"
lies between the legal code of ethics mandating confidentiality and ethical precepts in
auditing that require full disclosure). Langbaum suggests that this is not sufficient to

foreclose all MDPs from operating within the bounds of confidentiality; rather, it should
just be a "narrow limitation disallowing MDPs with both lawyers and auditors for one
client." Id.; see also Terry, supra note 20, at 892.
85. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Accountant Bosses Pose Ethical Threat, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
6, 1997, at A23; James M. McCauley, The Delivery of Legal Services Through MultidisciplinaryPractices(visited March 3,2001) <http//law.richmond.edu/RJOLPIIssues/Issue%2
02000spr/McCauley.html>; see also ABA Section of Litigation Issues Forum, Multidisciplinary Practice Argument: Pro [hereinafter Litigation Pro Argument] (visited March 3, 2001)
<http://www.abanet.org/litigation/issues/mdp/pro.html> (recognizing that "[tihe audit role
of the accountant and the lawyer role as advocate are incompatible"). Another example of
this tension is illustrated by a family MDP law firm in which lawyers, social workers, and
health care providers team up to help clients. If a social worker or doctor discovered
evidence that indicated child abuse by the client, then either would be obligated by law to
report the suspicions to the appropriate authority. Conversely, a lawyer would not, and
indeed could not, report this because of the rules on confidentiality. See McCauley, supra.
Of course, if the lawyer reasonably believed that imminent death or bodily harm might
come to someone at the hands of the client, she could disclose confidential information to
the extent necessary to prevent such harm. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.6(b) (1998).
86. See FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. CIV. P. 26; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 118-135 (1998).
87.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmts. 1 & 3.

88. See McCauley, supra note 85.
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privilege.8 9 Opponents of MDPs urge that this does the client a
disservice by limiting the availability of the attorney-client privilege and
jeopardizing the client's confidences by sharing them with nonlawyers
who are not subject to the same rules of professional conduct.9"
Moreover, critics of MDPs suggest that proponents operate only
"[ulnder the guise of providing more efficient services to clients and the
public at large" and that they are more interested in "sticking their
hands in the cookie jar," as the familiar expression goes, to share in legal
fees.91 Moreover, these opponents charge that consumer demand has
only been fabricated or manufactured to give plausibility to accountants'
arguments for MDPs. s2 MDP advocates counter that the demand is
real, citing statistics and pleas from clients that exemplify how MDPs
actually are sought out in substance if not in name.93
Opponents also note that the MDP paradigm is fraught with potential
conflicts of interests for the various clients of the MDP and the
professionals that serve them. 4 The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibit an attorney from representing a client if that representation may be materially limited by either the lawyer's own interests or
by his responsibilities to a third party, unless the lawyer reasonably
believes that the representation of the client will not be adversely
affected and the client consents after being notified of the conflict.95
Furthermore, ethical rules dictate under what circumstances a lawyer
may represent a client whose representation is adverse to another client,
current or former.9 6 Another rule imputes an attorney's disqualification

89. See, e.g., CALIF. EVID. CODE § 912 (providing for circumstances when privilege will
be deemed waived).
90. See Fox, Nightmare, supra note 78, at 1554-57.
91. Litigation Con Report, supra note 80.
92. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 135-36 (noting how opponents point
to the marketing efforts of the Big Five accounting firms to create apparent demand); see
also Lawrence J. Fox, The Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and
Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1107-08
(2000); Steven C. Krane, Written Testimony to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice(Aug. 8, 1999) (visited March 3, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/krane.html>.
93. See Gary L. Bakke, Where Do We Stand on MDP?, WISC. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 5, 5
(publishing letter from American corporate director seeking legal work integrated with
financial and tax considerations for international business); James W. Jones, Focusing the
MDP Debate: Historicaland PracticalPerspectives, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 993-95 (1999)

(recounting the contours of client demand for integration of professional services as
provided by MDPs); Sheryl Stratton, ABA Rattles Unauthorized Practice of Law Saber
While Debating MDPs, 86 TAx NOTES 1057 (1999).
94. See, e.g., Fox, Nightmare, supra note 78, at 1556-58.
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1998).
96. See id. Rules 1.7, 1.9.
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from representation for conflict of interest to the attorney's firm under
certain facts and circumstances.97 However, similar rules governing
conflicts of interest for certified public accountants ("CPAs") do not
require automatic imputed disqualification.9" To the opponents of
MDPs, this is just one example of how professions outside the law may
face difficulties reconciling their rules regarding conflicts of interest with
the legal rules of professional conduct. Proponents, not doubting the
importance of loyalty to the client, maintain that lawyers will not be any
more likely to be disloyal to clients in an MDP setting. Rather, some
MDP advocates argue the same rules on imputation should apply99
while others call for a loosening altogether of the ethical constraints on
screening and firewalls.'0 °
Finally, critics of MDPs fear the loss of their professional independence as lawyers if they partner with nonlawyers in MDPs. Model Rule
5.4 prohibits attorneys from practicing in organizations that have
nonlawyer corporate directors or officers or that give nonlawyers the
right to direct or control the professional judgment of the lawyers.'
These opponents predict the drive for profits will dictate how legal
matters are handled, thereby sacrificing the client and his cause and
usurping the role of the client in determining the objectives of the
representation under Model Rule 1.2.102 Lawrence Fox has written on
the relationship of profits, power, and control:
"It's the money." Follow the money and you'll follow the power. Follow
the power and you'll know who is in control. And as soon as the power
rests with non-lawyers not trained in, not dedicated to, and not subject
to discipline for our ethical principles, you will see the independence of
the profession fall away.103
Many opponents of MDPs stress that something about lawyers sets
them apart as special from other professions:

97.

See id. Rule 1.10.
See AICPA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 102-2 (1988).
99. See Utah Report, supra note 12 (calling for a "firm-wide imputation rule" if
necessary).
100. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 32, at 185-86; Daniel R. Fischel,
MultidisciplinaryPractice, 55 Bus. LAw. 951, 964-67 (2000); Abraham C. Reich, Scott L.
Vernick & Joshua Horn, Screening Mechanisms: A Broader Application? Balancing
Economic Realities and Ethical Obligations, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (1999).
98.

101.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d) (1998).

102. See id. Rule 1.2.
103. Lawrence J. Fox, You've Got the Soul of the Profession in Your Hands, Written
Remarks to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Drinker Biddle & Reath) (Feb.
4, 1998) (visited March 14, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/foxl.html>.
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The independence of the lawyer is just as critical as the independence
of the judiciary. Under our system of government, lawyers are unique.
We are special. We are in the Constitution. We are officers of the
court. We are fiduciaries whose charge is to preserve the rule of law.
We have kept the playing fields level and made sure people were
honest in the market place for over 200 years. We, lawyers and judges,
have provided the glue that has held the fabric of this country together,
and have contributed in great measure to the success of an economic
system and a democratic form of government that is the envy of the
We have literally been and are the guardians of this Repubworld.
14
lic. 0
To sum up, these opponents fear that the lawyer's professional judgment
could be overcome by her own interests or by any other improper factor.
However, advocates of MDPs suggest that lawyers do not live in a
professional vacuum that insulates them from the "influence of profit"
5
and that such a proposition "flies in the face of every recent trend.""
Proponents point to the current economic pressures that drive traditional
law firms today, and they maintain that no cognizable difference exists
106
Furtherbetween MDPs and traditional law firms in that respect.
allows
already
bar
the
practicing
that
emphasize
more, MDP supporters
lawyers to participate as in-house counsel, government lawyers, and
legal services attorneys, all of which subject lawyers to some degree of
supervision by nonlawyers.0 7
The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice recognized how
significant the fear of losing professional independence was for those
who oppose MDPs and therefore recommended the formation of MDPs
only when lawyers would preserve the "control and authority necessary
to assure lawyer independence."0 8 The Commission believed that by
suggesting safeguards it would aid the MDP in preserving the professional independence of its lawyers, and the Commission's commentary
in that regard will be useful for states facing the task of how to protect
this particular core value while allowing MDPs.'0°

104. Jack F. Dunbar, MultidisciplinaryPractice Translated Means "Let's Kill All the
Lawyers," 79 MICH. BAR J. 64, 64 (2000).
105. Eleanor W. Myers, Multidisciplinary Practice Debate Continues: It's Time to
Redefine What We as Lawyers Really Do, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 12, 1999, at 11.
106. See Litigation Pro Argument, supra note 85.
107. See Myers, supra note 105, at 12.
108. ABA Final Report, supra note 64.
109. See id.
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B.

Other Factors Shaping the Decision of Whether to Amend Rule 5.4
In addition to those arguments proffered by both sides, individual
state bar associations will have to look beyond the legal profession and
recognize external forces that will influence the MDP debate. First,
lawyers must consider the breadth of their client's activities. Presently,
the international business community is the clientele clamoring most
loudly for MDPs and integrated services. However, as the world grows
smaller, more clients will find themselves acting and thinking globally.
Therefore, lawyers must consider their clients' and potential clients'
needs for integrated services. Technology is another factor that will
shape the debate over MDPs. The planet is shrinking as the lines of
communication make for virtually instantaneous transactions and
decisions. The effects of technology have been heralded most within the
transactional aspect of the practice of law, but technology is relevant for
litigators, too. Everything is speeding up, and the average businessman
does not want to be slowed down by some form of dragged out litigation.
Arbitration and mediation are increasing in popularity, and much of this
dispute resolution is originating not with lawyers, but with other
professional service providers, such as those who operate in MDPs. At
a very minimum, lawyers cannot afford to ignore MDPs, and they would
be wiser still to address the issue with both sides in mind and an eye
toward the world around them.
IV. CONCLUSION
Scholars in the field of legal ethics agree that MDPs are a force with
which to reckon, and as one noted commentator and MDP advocate has
stated, "[Tihe 'MDP' is not simply coming, it is here." n ° Lawrence Fox,
one of the more vocal opponents of MDPs, has apparently even
acquiesced that MDPs are all around us, even if de facto in nature, by
his statement that "MDPs, like sneeze-inducing pollen in the spring, are
in the air.""' This analogy is probably more fitting than Mr. Fox
realized. Like springtime pollen, MDPs are garnering a negative
reaction from a certain bloc of persons; however, to carry the analogy one
step further, such a reaction is often the price paid to enjoy the more
positive benefits associated with the subject of disagreement. Similar to
the person who must take his allergy medication when the trees begin
to bloom in March and April, state bar associations must now look for

110. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., ChangingStructures in the Practiceof Law, 61 LA. L. REV.
167, 170 (2000).
111. Fox, Nightmare, supra note 78, at 1554.
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a remedy that will help the legal profession secure its core values while
enjoying the blossoms and benefits that can be gained from MDPs.
Hopefully, the state bar associations will address the issue of MDPs with
an air of optimism that will enable them to avoid being blinded by
vestiges of paternalism and economic protectionism in making a
reasonable and balanced decision.
JULIA
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